Tuesday, July 1, 2008

Gettysburg - 1 July 1863

Today is the 145th Anniversary of the opening engagement of the Battle of Gettysburg. Was this the South's missed opportunity to crush the Army of the Potomac and win the American Civil War?

On several occasions, the Army of Northern Virginia was presented with an opportunity to defeat a significant portion of its adversary. Gaines' Mill, Glendale, Second Manassas, Chancellorsville, and North Anna come to mind. Some might even argue for Fredericksburg to be included in this debate. But the first day in July, 1863 may have been the best missed chance.

What was always elusive to the Southern Cause was total victory on the battlefield. The Confederates needed to destroy a large portion of the Union Army. They had to eliminate the Army of the Potomac as a fighting force. They needed a complete victory to fan the fires of dissent across the Nothern states. This dissent would force a change in executive leadership in 1864 and bring both sides to the peace table. We must accept the fact that International Recognition was never a feasible goal following Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation. Only battlefield success would bring peace and the recognition of a Confederate States of America.

Gettysburg was a classic meeting engagement with two Armies bumbling into one another. Even though the Union Cavalry did a spendid job in delaying the Confederate advance, the South was able to bring more troops to bear at the critical time and place on the battlefield. But did the South lose a chance to destroy the Union First and Eleventh Corps? Would this have resulted in the desired end state of complete victory?

Reality is that the Union First and Eleventh Corps were in effect destroyed on 1 July 1863. They were never again a capable fighting force. But could the Confederates have attacked with better coordination? Could they have saved some precious daylight to completely rout the First and Eleventh Corps? Could they have reorganized their forces to attack and defeat elements of the Union Twelth and Third Corps that were approaching Gettysburg?

What should Lee and Longstreet have done on the afternoon of 1 July 1863? Much has been made of Longstreet's desire to fight a defensive engagement and slide around the Union left, but should he have been more aggressive? What would Stonewall Jackson have done if he was leading the old Second Corps on this field?

The Confederate attacks on the opening day were piecemeal, uncoordinated, and lacked effective command and control. Poor leadership was the story of the day with Ewell, Heth, Oneal, Rodes, Iverson, Pettigrew, Daniel, Davis, and others demonstrating how not to lead a Confederate corps, division, or brigade command. Confederate losses were heavy, but should have been avoidable. Coordination and leadership by example were missing. The effects on an attacking force were clearly demonstrated in the pounding that Heth's and Rodes' divisions incurred.

Just becuase one might unite his army on the battlefield before his opponent, does not guarantee total victory. Gettysburg's opening day is the prime example. For the most part, Northern leadership and command and control at the divisional and brigade level complemented by Yankee resolve and sacrifice held the day. Yes, two Union Corps were wrecked, but the losses inflicted on the Confederates and Southern leadership failures mitigated the level of tactical defeat. If the South could do it all over again, maybe they would take an operational pause to develop the situation, coordinate their movements and battlefield maneuver, synchronize their fires and flank attacks and exploit success with a sizeable reserve.

Then again, history tells us that the South lost its fighting spirit on the fields of Adams County, Pennsylvania. That spirit was embodied in the thousands of irreplaceable Southern soldiers lost due to failed leadership, failed command and control, and a lost cavalry commander.

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